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FORMER JEOPARDY-MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS-
PROHIBITION OF MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS OR PUNISHMENTS:
A DRUNK DRIVER'S TRIVIAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE
State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1996)
I. FACTS
Sheila A. Barnes was arrested by North Dakota Highway Patrolman
Matt Brown on March 19, 1995, for driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor in violation of North Dakota Century Code section
39-08-01.1 Bruce C. Jacobson was arrested by Officer Jay Gruebele of
the Jamestown, North Dakota Police Department on April 7, 1995, for
the same offense. 2 After their arrests, Jacobson and Barnes requested
administrative hearings pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section
39-20-04.1. The administrative hearing officer suspended Barnes'
driver's license for 365 days because it was her second offense within
five years. 4 Jacobson's driver's license was suspended for two years
because it was his third offense within five years. 5 Prior to their
individual trials, both defendants moved to dismiss the criminal charges
based on the assertion that their federal and state constitutional double
jeopardy rights had been violated.6
The district courts granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, and
the state appealed. 7 The cases were consolidated for the purposes of oral
argument and settlement. 8 The issue presented on appeal was whether
North Dakota's statutory and constitutional double jeopardy provisions
demand a different interpretation than the federal Double Jeopardy
Clause for an alleged drunk driver facing criminal prosecution following
an administrative driver's license suspension. 9  The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the district courts' decisions and held that the
1. Appellant's Brief-Barnes at 2, State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1996) (No. 95-0302);
see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1997) (discussing criminal punishment for driving under
the influence of alcohol).
2. Appellant's Brief-Jacobson at 2, Jacobson (No. 95-0259).
3. Appellant's Brief-Barnes at 3, Jacobson (No. 95-0259); Appellant's Brief-Jacobson at 3,
Jacobson (No. 95-0302); see also N.D. CENr. CODE § 39-20-04.1 (Supp. 1997) (discussing admini-
strative sanctions for driving or being in "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol).
4. Appellant's Brief-Barnes at 3, Jacobson (No. 95-0302).
5. Appellant's Brief-Jacobson at 3, Jacobson (No. 95-0259).
6. Id.; see also Appellant's Brief-Barnes at 3, Jacobson (No. 95-0302).
7. Appellant's Brief-Barnes at 3, Jacobson (No. 95-0302); Appellant's Brief-Jacobson at 3,
Jacobson (No. 95-0302).
8. State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152, 152 (N.D. 1996).
9. Id. at 152-53.
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state double jeopardy clause does not require an interpretation different
than that of the United States Constitution.lO
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Alleged drunk drivers have argued that administrative sanctions,
coupled with criminal prosecution, constitute a violation of their double
jeopardy rights. 1 ' Defendants rely on the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution to validate a fed-
eral constitutional claim. 12 Defendants also argue in the alternative that
individual state constitutions should provide greater double jeopardy pro-
tection than the United States Constitution for alleged drunk drivers. 13
A. FEDERAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION
The Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution dictates that no citizen's life shall be put in
jeopardy more than once for the same offense. 14 The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause as providing
protection against three specific abuses: first, a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal; second, a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction; and third, multiple punishments for the
same offense. 15
An alleged drunk driver arguing against criminal prosecution subse-
quent to an administrative sanction often relies on the Double Jeopardy
Clause's protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. 16
10. Id. at 153. The court determined that the framers of the state constitution did not intend
broader protection for defendants than that provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. (citing City of Fargo v. Hector, 534 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D. 1995)).
11. See id. (discussing the proposed violation of double jeopardy rights when a defendant is
criminally prosecuted following an administrative sanction); see also State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d
49, 51 (N.D. 1995) (arguing that administrative sanctions should be considered punishment for the
purpose of double jeopardy analysis).
12. See. e.g., Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 52.
13. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 153.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was intended to apply solely to the federal government. See
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1937) (discussing the necessity of independent state and
federal double jeopardy analysis). However, the Supreme Court later overruled Palko and concluded
that the Double Jeopardy Clause should apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The Supreme Court found that the "fundamental ideal" of
constitutional history necessitates application of the Fifth Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
15. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 717 (1969)).
16. See generally LAWRENCE TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 2.0.2, at 147-53 (3d. ed. 1991 &
Supp. 1994) (discussing the application of the double jeopardy clause in the defense of a drunk
driver); Stephanie Ann Miyoshi, Is the DUI Double-Jeopardy Defense D.O.A. ?, 29 Loy. L. REV. 1273,
1274 (1996) (commenting on a national trend of DUI defense attorneys arguing that their clients'
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The clause, however, does not prohibit multiple punishments in every
instance. 17 The United States Supreme Court held in Blockburger v.
United Statesl8 that double jeopardy protection applies only in cases
where a defendant is being prosecuted for the same criminal act under
two different statutes, which contain identical factors to be proven.19 The
Blockburger test mandates that double jeopardy rights are not violated if
one of the two statutory provisions contains a necessary element not
included in the other. 20
When claiming a violation of state or federal double jeopardy rights,
alleged drunk drivers rely on three United States Supreme Court cases
which apply the Blockburger test. 21 United States v. Halper,22 Austin v.
United States,23 and Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch24 are the
Supreme Court cases commonly referred to as the double jeopardy
trilogy. 25
In Halper, the Court ruled for the first time that a civil sanction may
constitute punishment, thus implicating the protections of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 26 Halper was convicted of sixty-five counts of vio-
lating the criminal false claims statute after submitting false Medicare
claims. 27 He was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and fined
$5,000.28 The government then brought a civil action against Halper for
the alleged violation of the False Claims Act and demanded that he
pay more than $130,000 for his sixty-five violations of the Act. 29 The
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants who
have already been criminally prosecuted from being subjected to a
non-remedial civil sanction intended to be a deterrent or retribution.30
double jeopardy rights have been violated).
17. But see CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 59 (15th ed. 1993) (noting that the
prosecution of the same offense under two different statutes constitutes double jeopardy).
18. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
19. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also TAYLOR, supra note 16, at
149-50 (explaining the Blockburger analysis and its application to a drunk driver's constitutional
argument).
20. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
21. See Jennifer E. Dayok, Administrative Driver's License Suspension: A Remedial Tool That is
Not in Jeopardy, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1151, 1161 (1996) (noting that there is a trilogy of Supreme Court
cases pertinent to double jeopardy analysis).
22. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
23. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
24. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
25. See Dayok, supra note 21, at 1161 (detailing the influence and composition of the trilogy).
26. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
27. Id. at 437.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729 to 3731 (1983 & Supp. 1997)).
30. Id. at 448-49. The Court discussed the necessity of allowing a defendant who has been
criminally prosecuted to demand an accounting of the government's damages and costs to ascertain
whether the civil penalty sought constitutes a second punishment. Id. at 449-50.
1997] 757
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In Austin, the Supreme Court clarified Halper by addressing the
punitive intent of civil forfeitures. 31 Austin pled guilty to one count of
cocaine possession with intent to deliver and was sentenced to imprison-
ment for seven years. 32 Pursuant to federal civil forfeiture statutes, the
government then commenced a forfeiture action of Austin's business
and mobile home. 33 Throughout the decision the Court relied on its
analysis in Halper, and concluded that the legislative history of in rem
forfeiture indicates a punitive intent on the part of the United States
Congress. 34 Thus, the Supreme Court held that in rem civil forfeiture is
subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause, but the Court said
nothing about how the punitive intent affected Double Jeopardy
concerns.
35
In Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court considered whether a Montana
tax for the possession of illegal drugs constitutes double jeopardy when
the tax followed the criminal prosecution and punishment of defendants
convicted of illegal drug possession.36 After six individuals were prose-
cuted for drug possession pursuant to Montana's Dangerous Drug Act, 37
the Montana Department of Revenue ordered them to pay approxi-
mately $900,000 pursuant to Montana's dangerous drug act. 38 On
appeal, the Court concluded that the drug tax was punishment for two
reasons. 39 First, the tax was conditioned upon the commission of the
crime which activated the tax obligation itself.40 Second, the overall
purpose of the high tax rate was to serve as a deterrent. 4 1 Thus, the
excessive tax was punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy
analysis.4 2
31. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610, 619 (1993).
32. Id. at 604.
33. Id. The United States Code provides for the forfeiture of conveyances and real property
used in the facilitation of drug possession and distribution, but provides an "innocent owner"
exception. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1997). The issue before the Court in Austin was whether the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to the in rem civil forfeiture proposed by the
government. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
34. Id. at 620.
35. Id. at 622.
36. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994).
37. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987) (repealed 1995). The Act authorized collec-
tion of a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs after appropriate state and federal
forfeitures had been satisfied. Id.
38. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942. See Ronald K. Sittler, Enlarging the Sargasso Sea of Double
Jeopardy: Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 477, 478-80 (1996) (discuss-
ing the underlying facts of the prosecution of the Kurth family pursuant to Montana's Dangerous Drug
Tax Act).
39. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1947-48.
42. Id. at 1948. The Court noted that the government's reliance on Halper was inappropriate.
Id. The nature of the Montana tax was fundamentally different from civil penalties and should not
have been treated as such. Id.; see also Sittler, supra note 38, at 518 (commenting on the Supreme
[VOL. 73:755
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Most recently, in United States v. Ursery43 the Court determined it
was necessary to clarify the double jeopardy trilogy. 44 The Court dis-
cussed the nature of civil forfeitures in relation to double jeopardy
analysis. 45 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals had held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the
government from criminally punishing a defendant and then forfeiting
his or her property in a separate civil proceeding.4 6 The Supreme Court,
however, decided that the circuit courts had misinterpreted precedent
established in the double jeopardy trilogy. 47  The Court noted that
reliance on the trilogy was inappropriate because Halper involved a civil
penalty rather than a civil forfeiture, Kurth Ranch addressed tax statutes,
and Austin did not involve the Double Jeopardy Clause at all. 48 Thus,
the Court concluded that precedent that analyzed the application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable with reference to civil
forfeitures. 49
The Court further noted that defendants who argue a violation
of their double jeopardy rights by a civil forfeiture must rely on
well-defined precedent.50 The Court used a two-part test to determine
whether a civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for the purpose
of double jeopardy.51 First, the Court considered the intent of the
Court's failure to recognize the substantial financial burden placed on state and local governments in
waging the war on illegal drugs when the Court struck down the Montana Drug Tax without any
reference to these costs).
43. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
44. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2143-44 (1996).
45. Id. at 2142.
46. Id. at 2139. The Ninth Circuit partially relied on the Sixth Circuit's decision when deciding
that civil forfeitures are punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. In the Sixth
Circuit case, the government instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the house where the
defendant grew marijuana. Id. at 2138-39. He was indicted and convicted of manufacturing mari-
juana and sentenced to 63 months in prison. Id. at 2139. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
relied on Supreme Court precedent with the understanding that any civil forfeiture was punishment.
Id. Thus, the court dismissed defendant's conviction because his double jeopardy rights had been
violated. Id. The Ninth Circuit also dismissed defendants' convictions on the basis of a double
jeopardy violation. Id. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamines
and money laundering charges. Id. Before defendants' criminal trial, the government commenced a
civil forfeiture action to obtain the property used in relation to the criminal charges. Id. The court
relied on the Sixth Circuit's analysis in deciding that the civil forfeiture was punishment and dismissed
the forfeiture action on the basis of double jeopardy. Id.
47. Id. at 2144.
48. Id. at 2147 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 436; Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 n.14; Kurth Ranch, 114 S.
Ct. at 1498).
49. Id.; see also United States v. lmngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that a
district court's reliance on the trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases is inappropriate when
determining whether the suspension of a motorist's driving privileges is remedial or punitive).
50. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 (relying on United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. 354, 363 (1993), One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) and
Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 578 (1931)).
51. See Id. at 2142; see also Iningren, 98 F.3d at 815 (discussing the application of the two-part
analysis outlined in Ursery).
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legislature. 52 Second, if the court determines the intent of the legislature
was remedial, it must ascertain whether the remedial intent is outweighed
by a practical punitive purpose and effect. 53 After applying the two-part
test to the facts in Ursery, the Court held that in rem civil forfeitures do
not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 54
B. NORTH DAKOTA STATUTORY LAW GOVERNING THE REGULATION
OF DRUNK DRIVING
In response to the increasing number of fatalities caused by drunk
drivers on American highways, state legislatures have enacted tougher
laws to help fight the drunk driving problem.5 5 North Dakota has
developed two primary methods of combating drunk driving.56 First, the
license of an alleged drunk driver is suspended temporarily to remove
him or her from the highway. 57 Second, a person suspected of driving
drunk is criminally prosecuted to punish and deter. 58 Despite some
indication that the combination of laws is reducing the number of
alcohol-related accidents and fatalities, there is some uncertainty
52. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142. The plain language of an administrative statute often indicates
whether the government intended the regulation to be remedial or punitive. See Imngren, 98 F.3d at
815. In Imngren, the court determined that the government's stated purpose in support of the one year
suspension of a motorist's driver's license for driving under the influence of alcohol included concern
for "safe and efficient movement of personnel and vehicles," and the "reduction of traffic deaths,
injuries, and property damage from traffic accidents." Id.
53. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that the
suspension of a motorist's driver's license for a year is not so punitive as to outweigh the stated
remedial intent of the government. Imngren, 98 F.3d at 816. The defendants argued that the one year
suspension of their driving privileges was punitive because the purpose was deterrence. Id. The court
dismissed the defendants' argument by relying the Supreme Court's rationale in Ursery. that
deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals. Id. (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994,
1000 (1996)).
54. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142. The Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 2143; see also United States v. Brophil,
96 F.3d 31, 32 (2nd Cir. 1996) (relying on Ursery, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
prosecution for the manufacture of marijuana following civil in rem forfeiture of the defendant's
property did not constitute double jeopardy); United States v. $87,118.00 in U.S. Currency, 95 F.3d
511, 515 (7th Cir. 1996) (relying on the analysis in Ursery, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
missed the double jeopardy argument advanced by Appellee, which was supported by his contention
that seizing currency pursuant to his arrest for drug importation constituted punishment).
55. See generally Dayok, supra note 21, at 1152-53 (discussing the positive impact of an admini-
strative driver's license suspension); David G. Dargatis, Put Down That Drink!: The Double Jeopardy
Drunk Driving Defense is Not Going to Save You, 81 IOWA L. R Ev. 775, 779-80 (1996) (discussing the
passage of the Drunk Driving Prevention Act of 1988, which is an Act passed by Congress to attempt
to reduce the number of alcohol-related traffic accidents and fatalities).
56. See, e.g., State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 51 (N.D. 1995) (discussing the motivation
behind the enactment of stiffer penalties for driving drunk).
57. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04.1 (Supp. 1995).
58. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1995).
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surrounding the future of administrative license suspensions. 59
1. Administrative Sanctions for Driving Under the Influence
Administrative sanctions for driving or being in physical control of
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol can be imposed in
addition to the criminal penalty requirements. 60 If a driver refuses to
submit to a chemical test, the law enforcement officer may immediately
take possession of his or her driver's license and issue a temporary
permit valid for twenty-five days. 61
A defendant may request an administrative hearing within a ten-day
time period after receiving a temporary operator's permit before the
suspension, revocation, or denial of a license.62 Regardless of whether
the defendant participates in the hearing, his or her driver's license is
suspended by the administrative director for ninety-one days for the first
offense. 63 A person's driver's license can be suspended for up to two
years depending on the number of prior violations. 64
2. Criminal Punishment for Driving Under the Influence
In 1923, the North Dakota Legislature made it a crime to operate a
motor vehicle when under the influence of alcohol. 65 The punishment
for such an offense was initially subject to judicial discretion. 66 The
present statutory law mandates a penalty for persons operating a motor
59. See generally Carlos F. Ramirez, Administrative License Suspensions, Criminal Prosecution
and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 923, 953 (1996) (considering the double
jeopardy argument in relation to administrative sanctions imposed by state governments).
60. § 39-20-04.1.
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (Supp. 1995).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-05(1) (Supp. 1995).
63. § 39-20-04.1(1)(a).
64. § 39-20-04.1(1)(c). If a person's license has been suspended or revoked at least twice pre-
viously within the proceeding five years, his or her license will be suspended for two years. Id. If the
person's license has been suspended or revoked once before in the proceeding five years, his or her
license will be suspended for 365 days. § 39-20-04.1(1)(b).
65. See State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 51 (N.D. 1995) (discussing the history of state laws
enacted to attack the drunk driving problem); see also 1923 N.D. Laws 254 §§ 1-2 (discussing the
legislative history which made it a crime to drive under the influence of alcohol).
66. 1923 N.D. Laws 254 §§ 1-2. The initial crime contained the two following sections:
a. That any person who shall operate a motor vehicle while such person is in an
intoxicated condition, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
b. Any person violating the provisions of Section 1 of this act shall be punishable by a
fine of not less than $25.00 nor more than $500.00, or by imprisonment in a county
jail for a period not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Provided, that the Court in sentencing any person for a violation of this Act, may
suspend any sentence of imprisonment or any part thereof, and make its order that
the person so sentenced shall be precluded from driving any automobile within this
State for a period of not to exceed two years.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:755
vehicle under the influence of alcohol or any other controlled
substance. 67 A person "may not drive or be in actual physical control"
of a motor vehicle if his or her blood alcohol concentration is ten
one-hundredths of one percent (.010%) by weight at the time of a chemi-
cal test administered within two hours after the alleged offense.68 The
statute dictates specific penalties depending on the number of previous
violations, if any. 69
To assist in the implementation of the statutory penalties, the North
Dakota Legislature adopted the Implied Consent Act in 1959.70 The
current version of this Act mandates that any person operating a motor
vehicle on a highway in North Dakota is considered to have consented to
a blood alcohol concentration chemical test. 7 1 If a person refuses such a
test, his or her license is suspended for up to three years.72
C. DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH DAKOTA DOUBLE JEOPARDY CASE LAW
Since the implementation of administrative sanctions, alleged drunk
drivers in North Dakota have argued that criminal prosecution following
an administrative sanction violates their state and federal double
jeopardy rights. 73 The North Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted the
state double jeopardy clause analogously to the federal constitutional
provision. 74 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court applies the
Blockburger test to the state double jeopardy clause as well.75
Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court continues to rely on
United States Supreme Court precedent, including the well-established
67. N.D. CEr. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1995).
68. § 39-08-01(l)(a); see also City of Bismarck v. Preston, 374 N.W.2d 602, 603-04 (N.D. 1985)
(mandating that the blood-alcohol test must be properly administered to preserve the admissibility of
the test results into evidence).
69. § 39-08-01(4). A person convicted of his or her first offense is subject to a fine of at least
$250 and is ordered to participate in an appropriate addiction evaluation. § 39-08-01(4)(a). A second
offense within a five year time period mandates that the convicted serve at least four days in jail or
perform 10 days community service, pay a minimum fine of $500, and attend another addiction
evaluation. § 39-08-01(4)(b). For a third offense within a five year time period, the convicted person
is imprisoned at least 60 days, fined $1000, and ordered once again to participate in an appropriate
licensed addiction treatment program. § 39-08-01(4)(c). A fourth offense within seven years
mandates that the defendant pay a $1000 fine and serve 180 days in jail. § 39-08-01(4)(d).
70. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1995); see also 1959 N.D. Laws 286 (providing for
suspension of a person's license to drive upon refusal to submit to a chemical test).
71. § 39-20-01.
72. Id. The chemical tests can be administered to determine the alcohol or drug content of the
blood. Id. The urine, blood, saliva, and breath can be assessed for the purpose of evaluation. Id.
73. See State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 53 (N.D. 1995). In response, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has recognized the necessity for an initial period of jeopardy which has terminated
before a defendant can allege a subsequent violation of his or her double jeopardy protection. State v.
Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805, 813 (N.D. 1974). Generally, a defendant is not put in jeopardy until he or she
is put on trial before a jury or a judge. Id.
74. See City of Fargo v. Hector, 534 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D. 1995).
75. Id. at 824.
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trilogy of double jeopardy cases, 76 to dictate the scope of state double
jeopardy protection. 77 However, North Dakota defendants have argued
for an independent evaluation of the state's constitutional provision in
an attempt to establish greater double jeopardy protection under state
law.78
In State v. Sinner,79 the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled for the
first time that an administrative driver's license suspension is not punish-
ment for the purpose of federal double jeopardy analysis.80 Subsequent
decisions by the court have further clarified the Sinner decision. 8 1
In State v. Zimmerman,82 the defendants claimed that their federal
double jeopardy rights had been violated.8 3 The defendants asserted that
North Dakota precedent 84 was no longer applicable because of the
trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases. 85 The court disagreed
with the defendants' reliance on the trilogy, however, and concluded that
the defendants' federal double jeopardy rights had not been violated. 86
However, the court left open the possibility that a defendant's state
double jeopardy rights may be violated when he or she is criminally
prosecuted following an administrative suspension of his or her driver's
license. 87
III. CASE ANALYSIS
The North Dakota Supreme Court further clarified double
jeopardy precedent in State v. Jacobson.8 8 The court considered for the
76. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994) (concluding that
the Montana drug tax was punishment); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 620 (1993) (concluding
that the legislative history of in rem forfeiture illustrated a remedial intent of Congress); United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989). (ruling that a civil sanction may constitute punishment
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause).
77. See Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 52-6 (discussing a trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases
relevant to the analysis of double jeopardy rights).
78. See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152, 153 (N.D. 1996) (arguing for an individual
analysis of the state constitution's double jeopardy clause).
79. 207 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1973).
80. See State v. Sinner, 207 N.W.2d 495, 501 (N.D. 1973).
81. See Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 52; Pladson v. Hjelle, 368 N.W.2d 508, 511 (N.D. 1985)
(deciding that the Implied Consent Act does not violate due process requirements).
82. 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995).
83. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 50.
84. Id. (citing Sinner, 207 N.W.2d at 501 (ruling that double jeopardy rights were not violated
when a defendant was criminally prosecuted for driving under the influence after an administrative
suspension of his license)).
85. See id. at 53 (citing Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994),
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 620 (1993), and United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49
(1989)); see also id. at 52-6 (explaining the importance of the trilogy to double jeopardy analysis).
86. See id. at 53 (distinguishing the analysis in the trilogy from a drunk driver's double jeopardy
argument).
87. Id.
88. State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152, 153 (N.D. 1996).
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first time whether an alleged drunk driver's state double jeopardy rights
are violated when he or she is subjected to criminal prosecution follow-
ing an administrative driver's license suspension. 89 The court extended
the rationale of Zimmerman and concluded that neither federal nor state
double jeopardy provisions are violated by criminal prosecution
subsequent to the issuance of an administrative sanction. 90
Justice Neumann, writing for the court, began by noting the double
jeopardy precedent established in Zimmerman.9 1 Relying on Zimmer-
man, the court dismissed the federal constitutional arguments advanced
by the defendants. 92 The court concluded that criminal prosecution
following an administrative sanction is not a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 93
The court refused to interpret the state double jeopardy clause
differently than the federal Double Jeopardy Clause.94 The hesitancy to
overrule precedent prompted the dismissal of the defendants' interpre-
tation of the state's statutory and constitutional double jeopardy pro-
visions.95 The court noted two earlier decisions, State v. Allesi 96 and City
of Fargo v. Hector,97 to support the conclusion that the state clause
should not be interpreted differently than the federal constitutional
provision.98
Chief Justice VandeWalle, concurring specially, agreed with the
defendants' assertion that under certain circumstances the state constitu-
tion may demand an interpretation different from that of the United
States Constitution.99 Justice VandeWalle noted that although several
appellate courts have decided the issue, 00 the United States Supreme
89. Id.; see also Brief of the Appellee-Jacobson at 18, Jacobson (N.D. 1996) (No. 95-0259).
Defendants argued that the court should follow the rationale of earlier case law and provide
heightened protection to alleged drunk drivers facing criminal prosecution following an administrative
driver's license suspension. Id.
90. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 153.
91. Id. (citing Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 56 (holding that an administrative sanction does not
constitute punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 216 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1974).
97. 534 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1995).
98. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 153 (citing City of Fargo v. Hector, 534 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D.
1995) (deciding that double jeopardy rights were not violated because the defendant was not punished
twice for the same offense), and State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805, 817-18 (N.D. 1974) (noting that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment)).
99. See id. (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially).
100. Id. (citing State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that admini-
strative sanctions are remedial, not punitive sanctions for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis),
Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1995) (concluding that "enhancing safe
driving on the public highways" is the remedial purpose of administrative sanctions), and State v. Higa,
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Court has yet to decide whether a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause will be an applicable defense for an alleged drunk driver.101
Also relevant to the Justice VandeWalle's analysis was his reliance
on the passive Zimmerman decision.l0 2 Justice VandeWalle agreed that
state administrative sanctions relating to drunk driving statutes are not
punitive.103 Justice VandeWalle dismissed any incidental punitive affect
of the sanction as being subordinate to the remedial intent. 104 Justice
VandeWalle also addressed the history of the state constitution and
concluded that the framers did not intend for the double jeopardy
protection to prohibit practical administrative sanctions. 105
Justice Meschke's concurrence also relied on Zimmerman,10 6 and
the history of the state constitution. 107 Justice Meschke agreed with the
dissent in that the state constitution should be interpreted separately from
the United States Constitution.S08 However, an independent analysis did
not mandate a different conclusion in the case at hand.l0 9
Justice Meschke further noted that the United States Supreme Court
had yet to determine at what point civil forfeitures and monetary sanc-
tions following criminal prosecution will invoke federal double jeopardy
protection. 110 Justice Meschke acknowledged that Justice Levine's well-
reasoned dissent may provide the court with guidance when considering
double jeopardy protection in relation to those particular issues in the
future." 11
897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995) (holding that Hawaii's administrative sanctions were not punitive, but
remedial in nature; therefore, they were not applicable to the double jeopardy argument)).
101. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 153.
102. See id. (citing State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 55-56 (N.D. 1995) (noting the court's
discussion about the remedial purpose of administrative driver's license suspensions despite any
incidental punitive affect)).
103. Id. at 154. Chief Justice VandeWalle specifically disagreed with Justice Levine's analysis
in her dissent concluding that administrative license suspensions are punishment. Id.
104. See id. Chief Justice VandeWalle noted that the "realistic" approach taken in the dissent
supports the conclusion that administrative sanctions are remedial, not punitive because the priority is
to remove drunk drivers from the state's roads. Id.
105. Id. A practical look the framers' intent persuaded the Chief Justice that "suspension of the
license to drive of a convicted drunk driver for the safety of the public was not what they had intended
to prevent." Id.
106. See Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 49 (determining that despite the trilogy, the administrative
suspension of an alleged drunk driver's license is remedial in nature).
107. See Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 154 (Meschke, J., concurring) (discussing the remedial nature
of a convicted drunk driver's loss of a driver's license).
108. See id.
109. Id. Justice Meschke agreed with the dissent that the state constitution provides more
protection than the United States Constitution in some instances. Id.
110. Id. at 155 (Meschke, J., concurring); see also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142
(1996) (discussing the application of a two-part test to determine whether a civil forfeiture is
punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis).
11l. Jacobson, 545 N.w.2d at 155. Justice Meschke addressed the Supreme Court's most recent
decision at that time concerning the punitive nature of civil forfeitures. Id.; see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct.
at 2142 (concluding that not all civil forfeitures should be considered punishment).
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In another concurrence, Justice Sandstrom dismissed the validity of
Justice Levine's dissent in regard to its constitutional analysis."l 2 Justice
Sandstrom stated that the intent of North Dakota's double jeopardy
provision was to prevent the state from doing what the federal govern-
ment was prohibited from doing. 113 In support of his conclusion, Justice
Sandstrom reasoned that the state's constitutional history11 4 indicated
strong evidence that North Dakota relied on other state constitutions
when writing the state's own double jeopardy provision. 115 Citing the
supreme court's analysis in Zimmerman, Justice Sandstrom rejected the
defendants' reliance on the recent trilogy of United States Supreme
Court decisions. 116
Justice Levine dissented from the court's decision because she
believed that an alleged drunk driver's state double jeopardy protection
is violated when he or she is criminally prosecuted following an admini-
strative license suspension. "17 Justice Levine was convinced by the defen-
dants' reasoning that it was time to abandon the court's precedent.118
In Allesi, the court rejected the argument that the state double
jeopardy provision should be interpreted differently than the Fifth
Amendment.11 9 Justice Levine disagreed with this decision and argued
for the necessity of independent state analysis.120 Justice Levine noted
several other decisions' 2' where the court granted greater protection than
the federal government. 122
Justice Levine also maintained that the court should consider the
source of guidance to the delegates of the North Dakota Constitutional
112. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 155 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Hon. Herbert L. Meschke & Lawrence D. Spears, Diggingfor Roots: The North
Dakota Constitution and the Thayer Correspondence, 65 N.D. L. REV. 343, 346-47 (1989) (discussing
the Constitutional Celebration Committee's efforts to search for documentation identifying the sources
of the North Dakota Constitution) and Model Constitution (Peddrick Draft #2, 1889), 65 N.D. L. R EV.
415, 422 (1989) (discussing the history of the North Dakota Constitution and its double jeopardy
protection)).
115. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 155 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 156; Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 52-56.
117. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 156 (Levine, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 157 (Levine, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805, 817-18 (N.D.
1973) (noting that "the Allesi decision was unsupported by authority or reasoning, and deserves no
further adherence")).
120. Id. at 156.
121. Id. at 157 (citing In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 566 (N.D. 1993) (affording
broader state rights in relation to termination of parental rights), Grand Forks-Traill Water Users, Inc.
v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344, 348 (N.D. 1987) (addressing the defendant's argument that North
Dakota's eminent domain statutes were unconstitutional because of an equal protection violation), and
State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177 (N.D. 1985) (discussing whether the state constitution permitted a
conviction rendered without counsel relevant to a subsequent offense)).
122. Id.
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Convention.1 23 Justice Levine noted that the South Dakota Constitution
and the "Williams Constitution" guided the North Dakota delegates.124
Furthermore, the state's constitutional history, coupled with the court's
rulings prior to the Allesi decision, 125 established a pattern of providing
significant double jeopardy protection for North Dakota's citizens. 126
Justice Levine argued for individual interpretation of the state
constitution. 127 In support of that argument, Justice Levine discussed the
court's decision to assess state jury trial rights separately from federal
rights. 128 Equating jury trial rights with double jeopardy protection,
Justice Levine maintained that precedent demanded a separate
interpretation. 129
Justice Levine also relied on the constitutional precedent of other
states in her analysis. 130 Justice Levine commented that Montana has
refused to apply the Blockburger test and instead relies on the "same
transaction" test to determine whether double jeopardy protection is
violated.131
Further, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that the issue of
constitutional interpretation is one of federalism and should be decided
as such. 132 Based on these factors, Justice Levine reasoned that the
court's reliance on the North Dakota Constitution should lead to the
conclusion that criminal prosecution of a drunk driver following an
administrative sanction is double jeopardy.133
Justice Levine requested a "realistic" look at the nature of the
administrative driver's license suspension.134 Justice Levine contended
that all North Dakota citizens would recognize a driver's license suspen-
sion as punishment because of the practical impact of the suspension.135
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 158. (citing State v. Nierenberg, 80 N.W.2d 104, 108 (N.D. 1956) (concluding that the
defendant's argument of former jeopardy and res judicata could not be sustained when the defendant
was subjected to perjury charges as a result of an earlier prosecution) and State v. Simpson, 50
N.W.2d 661, 667 (N.D. 1951) (addressing the defendant's claim that being prosecuted under state law
following city prosecution constituted double jeopardy)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 159.
128. Id. at 157 (citing City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760, 765 (N.D. 1984)).
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 159 (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that the "same
transaction" test refers to double jeopardy analysis in which the pivotal question is whether the
charges stem from the same transaction)).
132. Id. at 160 (citing State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983) (explaining the
individual nature of state constitutions)).
133. Id. at 161.
134. Id.
135. See id. Justice Levine discussed the practical need for automobile transportation in a state
which does not provide mass transportation in the majority of its cities. Id.
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Justice Levine also discussed the fact that after a defendant's license is
suspended, he or she is required to pay a reinstatement fee to regain his
or her license, unlike one who has had his or her license suspended for
something other than driving drunk.136
Relying on the legislative history,137 Justice Levine maintained that
the administrative sanctions are punishment and were intended to be so
despite any stated remedial purpose. 138 Justice Levine concluded that a
violation of the state's double jeopardy clause occurs when a person is
punished twice for driving under the influence.139
IV. IMPACT
The North Dakota Supreme Court has left little precedent to support
the seemingly routine state and federal double jeopardy argument.140
Since the Jacobson decision, the supreme court has continued to reject
this popular defense.141 The supreme court's position is well-supported
and consistent with controlling federal precedent.142Nationally, the
emerging trend discourages the double jeopardy defense.143 Several
states have rejected the drunk driver's reliance on the double jeopardy
clause to protect him or her from criminal punishment.144 Considering
the national trend and the well-reasoned case law, absent a contrary
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, the North Dakota Supreme
Court will not likely reverse its decision.145
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing 1983 N.D. Laws 415). Justice Levine illustrated the punitive intent of the
sanctions by relating comments made by legislators. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 152-53.
141. See State v. Storbakken, 552 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1996) (citing Zimmerman and Jacobson,
the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's double jeopardy argument because his
license was not suspended during an administrative hearing); State v. Barth, 545 N.W.2d 162, 163
(N.D. 1996) (attempting to distinguish Zimmerman because defendant's driver's license was sus-
pended for one year, even though he was only convicted of reckless driving after a second offense);
State v. Kvislen, 544 N.W.2d 876, 877 (N.D. 1996) (declining to interpret punishment differently than
federal law).
142. See, e.g., Edward J. Kelley, Double Jeopardy and Drunk Driving: Imposing Civil and Crimi-
nal Sanctions for the Same Offense, 55 MD. L. R EV. 549, 557 (1996) (discussing the Maryland Court of
Appeals' decision that the suspension of a driver's license authorized by a civil statute did not
constitute punishment as applied to a driver whose blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit).
143. See, e.g., Todd A. LaSala, The Decisive Blow to the Double Jeopardy Defense in Kansas
Drunk Driving Prosecutions: State v. Mertz, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 1009, 1024 (1996) (commenting that
as of August 1996, every court at the appellate level, with the exception of Ohio, has held that
administrative license suspension is not "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes).
144. See, e.g., Allen v. Attorney General State of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 577 (1st Cir. 1996)
(refusing to reverse the trial court's decision to not issue a writ of habeas corpus and further deciding
that Maine's 90 day license suspension for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol
serves the state's remedial purpose to apprehend "danger and potential harm").
145. See LaSala, supra note 142, at 1024 (discussing the appellate courts' treatment of the double
jeopardy defense).
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The United States Supreme Court may have an opportunity to
decide the double jeopardy issue if there is an appeal from a state
supreme court decision. However, a Supreme Court holding would be
problematic considering the vast differences in administrative sanctions
mandated by individual states for driving under the influence of
alcohol.146 Any decision affecting individual state statutes would likely
be subject to severe criticism.
A framework for review of how North Dakota's civil sanctions are
characterized will likely emerge from the analysis in Jacobson and
Ursery.147 Whether a civil forfeiture is a remedial sanction or punish-
ment is determinative of the application of double jeopardy protec-
tion. 148 Since the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson,
the United States Supreme Court has illustrated its hesitancy to automati-
cally interpret civil sanctions as punishment for the purpose of double
jeopardy analysis. 149 The Supreme Court has outlined a two-part test in
Ursery for courts to ascertain whether a civil sanction is punitive in effect
despite any remedial intent of the legislature. 150 If so, double jeopardy
protection attaches.'151
Furthermore, the two-part test applied in Ursery supports the
rationale of the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson.152
The North Dakota Supreme Court has acknowledged the remedial intent
of civil sanctions imposed by the North Dakota Legislature as an attempt
to decrease automobile accidents and fatalities caused by drunk
drivers.153 It is not likely that the supreme court will decide that the
minor inconvenience caused by the temporary suspension of a person's
driver's license privilege outweighs a legislative attempt to save human
lives. 154
146. See Dayok, supra note 21, at 1153 n.9 (listing the 38 statutes imposed by state legislatures
which mandate automatic suspension of an individual's driver's license if he or she fails a
breathalyzer test).
147. State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152, 153 (N.D. 1996); United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct.
2135, 2149 (1996).
148. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id.; see also Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d at 153.
153. Id. at 154 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially); see also State v. Zimmerman, 539
N.W.2d 48-53 (N.D. 1995) (citing Kobilansky v. Liffrig, 358 N.W.2d 781, 791 (N.D. 1984)
(illustrating the court's judicial notice of "the carnage caused by the drunk driver") and South Dakota
v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 58-59 (1983) (noting the extensive documentation of the "carnage" caused
by drunk drivers)).
154. The United States Supreme Court would also likely decide an alleged drunk driver's double
jeopardy rights are not violated when he or she is faced with criminal prosecution following an
administrative driver's license suspension. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142 (1996)
(discussing the Supreme Court's hesitancy to interpret many civil sanctions as punishment for the
purpose of double jeopardy analysis); see also United States v. lmngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir.
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The resources of an alleged drunk driver in North Dakota should be
allocated in support of defenses other than double jeopardy. For future
drunk drivers and their attorneys, the Jacobson decision should curtail
the advancement of any further state and federal double jeopardy
defenses in North Dakota. Double jeopardy is a trivial constitutional
defense at best.
Kari C. Stonelake Hopkins
1996) (deciding that a drunk driver's reliance on the trilogy was inappropriate).
